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THE ORIGINAL INTENTION OF ORIGINAL 
UNDERSTANDING* 
Jack N. Rakove** 
In 1985, amid mounting interest in the idea of a return to a 
"jurisprudence of original intention," the Harvard Law Review 
published H. Jefferson Powell's important article on "The Origi-
nal Understanding of Original Intent."l In this acute and ironic 
criticism of the theory of originalism, Powell argued that the 
modern notion which equates the intention of a legal document 
with the subjective purposes of its author(s) was not part of the 
interpretive arsenal on which the framers of the Constitution 
could draw as they tried to imagine how its provisions would be 
construed. Although some eighteenth-century commentators 
understood that interpretation should strive to recover the pur-
poses of the parties to a legal document, in practice that intention 
was almost always both reducible to and discoverable in its ex-
plicit language. There was no notion or tradition of construing a 
statute by examining its legislative history. In case of ambiguity, 
interpreters might consider the purposes declared in the pream-
ble, but they relied far more on the rules of common law adjudi-
cation. Knowledge of the intention of a statute, Powell 
concluded, was far less a guide to interpretation than its product, 
an understanding formed and refined over time through a course 
of reasoning and practice. And when something like a theory of 
intention did emerge in the realm of constitutional interpreta-
tion, Powell observed, it was tied to the states' -rights "doctrine of 
1798," which made the quasi-sovereign states the contracting par-
ties to the federal union. Powell thus linked the appearance of 
an intentionalist theory of constitutional intepretation to the 
great heresy that the Civil War ostensibly laid to rest. 
* This article is a revised version of Jack N. Rakove, "Madison and the Origins of 
Originalism," Original Meamngs: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution 339-
65 (Alfred A. Knopf 1996). I owe a scholarly debt to H. Jefferson Powell and Charles 
Lofgren for framing the basic issues I consider here. 
** Professor of History, Stanford University. 
1. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 Harv. L. 
Rev. 885 (1985) in Jack N. Rakove, ed., Interpreting the Constitution: The Debate Over 
Original Intent 53 (Northwestern U. Press, 1990). 
159 
160 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 13:159 
Persuasive as it seemed, Powell's argument proved vulnera-
ble to serious criticism. Reviewing Powell's use of sources, 
Charles Lofgren discovered a cavalier approach to the historical 
evidence.z More important, Lofgren argued that Powell erred in 
limiting his inquiry to the relevance of the intentions of the fram-
ers of the Constitution while ignoring the understandings of its 
ratifiers. Some disputants in the political debates of the 1790s, 
Lofgren concluded, clearly thought that the expectations, under-
standings, and intentions of the ratifiers could serve as a restraint 
on doubtful constructions of the Constitution. Nor could it be 
taken for granted, Lofgren implied, that early interpreters 
thought that the Constitution should be read quite like a statute, 
contract, or will, subject to the familiar rules of common law ad-
judication. The Constitution certainly was a kind of law, but not 
any kind of law; and its true intepretation might plausibly follow 
other rules. Lofgren agreed with Powell that knowledge of the 
intentions of the framers at Philadelphia was not thought an ap-
propriate guide to interpretation, but that reservation did not ap-
ply to the intentions-or perhaps we should say the 
understandings-of its ratifiers. 
No piece of historical evidence looms larger in this ratifier-
understanding variant of originalism than a speech that congress-
man James Madison gave in April 1796, when the House of Rep-
resentatives was debating its constitutional role in the 
implementation of the controversial Jay Treaty. In this speech, 
Madison excluded evidence of the intentions of the framers at 
Philadelphia from the canon of acceptable sources, but at the 
same time he affirmed that evidence of what the Constitution 
meant to its legal ratifiers in the state conventions was pertinent. 
But, after all, whatever veneration might be entertained for 
the body of men who formed our constitution. the sense of 
that body could never be regarded as the oracular guide in the 
expounding the constitution. As the instrument came from 
them, it was nothing more than the draught of a plan, nothing 
but a dead letter, until life and validity were breathed into it, 
by the voice of the people, speaking through the several state 
conventions. If we were to look therefore, for the meaning of 
the instrument, beyond the face of the instrument, we must 
look for it not in the general convention, which proposed, but 
2. Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 Const. 
Comm. 77 (1988) in Rakove, ed., Interpreting the Constitution at 117 (cited in note 1). 
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in the state conventions, which accepted and ratified the 
constitution) 
161 
Madison's statement distills the crucial premise of originalism: 
The Constitution is supreme law because it rests on the direct 
imprimatur of a sovereign people, expressed through the ex-
traordinary procedures required for ratification; and its original 
meaning, whenever it can be recovered, should accordingly pre-
vail over the lesser acts of legislators and the preferences of 
jurists. 
But can Madison's statement indeed be taken by itself, as a 
sufficient early expression of a valid theory of originalism? 
While Powell and Lofgren both cite Madison's speech, neither 
locates it in the political context in which it was originally given. 
Restoring Madison's speech to the political circumstances of 
1796, however, has the effect of converting its apparently robust 
statement of originalism into a weak, even muddled effort to 
blunt the Federalist counterattack against Republican criticism of 
the Jay Treaty. Nor is Madison's endorsement of ratifier-under-
standing in 1796 easily reconciled with his own original under-
standing of the character of the ratification debates of 1787-1788, 
which he had then described in disparaging terms. To trace the 
path that Madison followed from principal framer of the Consti-
tution to founding father of originalism thus offers a fascinating 
commentary on the political character of early constitutional 
interpretation. 
In one essential respect, Powell's argument certainly rests on 
firm historical ground. One searches the voluminous records of 
the debates of 1787-1788 almost in vain for evidence that the 
framers and ratifiers imagined that later interpreters would ex-
amine the extant documentary sources for the "great national 
discussion" of 1787-1788 as an aid to determining what the Con-
stitution originally meant.4 In the rare instances when such refer-
ences appear, their use tends to confirm Powell's basic point. 
Consider, for example, Hamilton's efforts in Federalist 33 to 
answer the "virulent invective and petulant declamation" that 
Anti-Federalists were directing against the necessary and proper 
3. J. Madison, speech of Apr. 6, 1796, in J.C.A. Stagg, ed., 16 The Papers of James 
Madison 290, 295-96 (U. Press of Virginia, 1989). 
4. The phrase is Hamilton's in Federalist 1 (Hamilton) in Jacob E. Cooke, ed., The 
Federalist Papers 3, 5 (Wesleyan U. Press, 1%1). It was most recently borrowed by Isaac 
Kramnick for his essay, The "Great National Discussion": The Discourse of Politics in 
1787, 45 Wm. & Mary Q. 3 (1988). 
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clause.s This "sweeping clause"6 would in fact obviate the need 
for "construction" without enlarging the powers the Constitution 
vested in Congress, Hamilton argued. But suppose Congress 
wrongly impinged the authority of a state. The "forced construc-
tions" needed to support such palpably unconstitutional acts 
would be so apparent that "the people" could then readily "ap-
peal to the standard they have formed" -the Constitution-
"and take such measures to redress the injury done to the Consti-
tution, as the exigency may suggest and prudence justify."7 "If 
there should ever be a doubt on this head," he concluded, "the 
credit of it will be entirely due to those reasoners who, in their 
imprudent zeal of their animosity to the plan of the Convention, 
have labored to envelop it in a cloud, calculated to obscure the 
plainest and simplest truths."s In other words, if the people were 
later confused about the limits of the powers of Congress, it 
would only be because Anti-Federalist invective, by dint of repe-
tition, had turned the necessary and proper clause into the en-
gine of tyranny it was never meant to be. 
James Iredell verged toward a similar argument when he 
asked the first North Carolina ratification convention to consider 
the consequences of resting the authority of constitutional rights 
on the potentially incomplete enumeration of a formal declara-
tion of rights. Iredell asked the delegates to imagine how future 
rulers bent on invading some fundamental right left unmentioned 
in such a declaration might reason historically about its omission. 
Would they not naturally say, "We live at a great distance from 
the time when this Constitution was established. We can judge 
of it much better by the ideas of it entertained at the time, 
than by any ideas of our own. The bill of rights, passed at that 
time, showed that the people did not think every power re-
tained which was not given. else this bill of rights was not only 
useless, but absurd. "9 
Later interpreters would naturally assume that their "ancestors," 
scrupulous in "their attachment to liberty," had incorporated 
every right they deemed worthy of protection.w Yet even in this 
effort to think of interpretation as a process of historical recov-
5. Federalist 33 (Hamilton) in Cooke, ed., The Federalist Papers at 204 (cited in 
note 4). 
6. !d. at 205. 
7. Id. at 206. 
8. !d. at 206-07. 
9. J. Iredell, speech of July 28, 1788, in Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner, eds., 1 
The Founders' Constitution 475, 476 (U. of Chicago Press, 1987). 
10. !d. 
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ery-one generation reconstructing the purposes of another-
Iredell assumed that interpreters would have no useful sources to 
examine beyond the Constitution itself. Acting "long after all 
traces of our present disputes were at an end," they would not 
examine documentary evidence to reconstruct the debate to 
which he was now contributing.n They would read the Constitu-
tion much as Federalists were reading it now, relying on its plain 
language and structure to ascertain its meaning. If some rights 
were enumerated and others not, they would need no other evi-
dence to conclude that the omissions were deliberate. 
For Federalists, then, the idea that later interpreters might 
resort to evidence drawn from the ratification debates carried a 
perverse implication. Repetition of the wild charges that Anti-
Federalists were directing against the Constitution might have 
the effect of fulfilling its adversaries' bleak predictions that the 
tyranny of consolidation and the restriction of liberty were the 
true intentions of the document. By insisting that their extreme 
readings of its clauses were correct, Anti-Federalists risked mak-
ing the Constitution a far more dangerous document than it was 
meant to be. 
Anti-Federalists, by contrast, generally argued that the lan-
guage of the Constitution was so malleable as to invite the open-
ended "construction" they dreaded. In a sense, Anti-Federalists 
did imagine that this process of intepretation would be faithful to 
the purposes of the framers. Rather than portray the latent dan-
gers of the Constitution as the unintended consequences of inad-
equate deliberation and sloppy draftsmanship, they suggested 
that the "dark conclave" at Philadelphia had conspired to fasten 
a charter of tyranny on their unsuspecting countrymen. And 
once delegate Luther Martin began to publish his Genuine Infor-
mation about the debates in the Federal Convention, Anti-Feder-
alists had a plausible basis for thinking these suspicions well 
founded.12 
Nevertheless, Anti-Federalists rarely if ever implied that evi-
dence of what was being said about the Constitution in 1787-1788 
would provide later interpreters with a useful guide to its mean-
11. Id. 
12. Philadelphiensis, no. X, Phikldelphia Freeman's Journal, Feb. 20, 1788, in John P. 
Kaminski and Gaspare J. Saladino, eds., 16 Documencary History of the Ratification of the 
Constitution 158, 159 (State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1986). Luther Martin's serial 
history of the Convention first appeared in the Middlesex Gazette and was reprinted as 
The Genuine Information Delivered to the Legislature of the State of Maryland Relative to 
the Proceedings of the General Convention Lately Held at Philadelphia (Eleazer Oswald, 
1788); for convenience, it may be read most easily in Herbert J. Storing, ed., 2 The Com· 
plete Ami-Federalist 19 (U. of Chicago Press, 1981). 
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ing. Insofar as Anti-Federalists protested that the advocates of 
the Constitution were misrepresenting its deeper intentions, they 
could hardly have credited Federalist positions as accurate state-
ments of the true meaning of the Constitution. From their point 
of view, such interpretations were necessarily deceptive. Pre-
sumably their own dissents would provide better predictions of 
what the Constitution really meant-though should it be 
adopted, their comments must represent the skeptical views of 
the non-ratifying minority, rather than the presumably more au-
thoritative judgments of the approving majority. 
In only one respect did some Anti-Federalists belatedly 
stumble upon a formula that might enable their expressed con-
cerns to serve as a possible brake on erroneous interpretations of 
the Constitution. In those states where the Constitution was 
hotly debated or closely contested, Anti-Federalist strategy typi-
cally wavered between merely recommending amendments to the 
early consideration of the new Congress, or somehow making the 
ratification by their particular state contingent upon the prior 
adoption of specific amendments. Federalists struggled hard and, 
on the whole, successfully, to restrict their opponents to the for-
mer alternative. But in the New York convention, the final ma-
neuvers surrounding the act of ratification included the adoption 
of two sets of amendments: one, essentially a bill of rights, offer-
ing "Explanations" of these rights "consistent with the said Con-
stitution"; the other recommending substantive changes to the 
main text. Had Anti-Federalists in other states hit upon this ex-
planatory expedient at an earlier point, they conceivably could 
have developed it into a device to convert expressions of opinion 
into statements with some interpretative authority. But New 
York was the eleventh state to endorse the Constitution, and its 
action came too late to leave a legacy for subsequent inter-
preters.13 
Intriguing as these scattered references may be, their very 
paucity tends to confirm what Powell argues and Lofgren would 
probably concede: that neither the framers nor the ratifiers had 
any notion that documentary evidence of their intentions and un-
derstandings would provide intepreters with a useful guide to the 
true meaning of the Constitution. The text and structure of the 
13. I discuss the variety of ways in which Federalists and Anti-Federalists jockeyed 
over the character of the decision the state conventions would take in Jack N. Rakove, 
Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution 114-115 (Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1996). For the text of the New York instrument of ratification, with its multiple 
forms of amendments, see Linda Grant DePauw, The Eleventh Pillar: New York State and 
the Federal Constitution 293-302 (Cornell U. Press, 1966). 
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document would provide the locus of interpretation; historical 
evidence of the debates would not be relevant. 
There is no reason to think that James Madison held any 
different view during the debates of 1787-1788, and good reason 
to suspect that he privately believed that misrepresentation and 
demagoguery were the chief currencies in which they had been 
conducted. Madison did the best he could to elevate the tone of 
debate in The Federalist and at the Richmond convention, but he 
did not hold a high opinion of much of the polemical literature 
and speech-making that ratification occasioned, or of the capac-
ity of most citizens to form independent opinions on as compli-
cated a subject as the Constitution.J4 In the Virginia convention, 
he had to contend with the erratic tactics of his chief adversary, 
Patrick Henry, whose rambling if brilliant oratory made an or-
derly discussion of the Constitution difficult. 
Even after the Constitution was ratified, Madison feared 
that "the feverish state of the public mind" had to be carefully 
reduced to a more placid condition.Js He was upset when Hamil-
ton and other New York Federalists endorsed their opponents' 
call for a second general convention. "The delay of a few years 
will assuage the jealousies which have been artifically created by 
designing men and will at the same time point out the faults 
which really call for amendment," he wrote Jefferson. "At pres-
ent the public mind is neither sufficiently cool nor sufficiently in-
formed for so delicate an operation."t6 When his friend Edmund 
Randolph endorsed this idea,11 Madison replied that "an early 
convention" would "be the offspring of party & passion, and will 
probably for that reason alone be the parent of error and public 
injury."ts The fact of ratification suggested that "a greater pro-
portion" of the American people were content with the Constitu-
tion. "Should radical alterations take place they will not result 
from the deliberate sense of the people," he concluded, "but will 
be obtained by management, or extorted by menaces."t9 
I4. On this point, see especially his revealing letter to E. Randolph of Jan. IO, 1788, 
in Robert A. Rutland, et al., eds., 10 The Papers of James Madison 354 (U. of Chicago 
Press, 1977). 
15. Letter of J. Madison to T. Jefferson, Sep. 21, 1788, in Robert A. Rutland, et al., 
eds., 11 The Papers of James James Madison 257, 258 (U. Press of Virginia, 1977). 
16. Letter of 1. Madison toT. Jefferson, Aug. 10, I788, in Rutland, et al., eds., 11 The 
Papers of James Madison at 226 (cited in note 15). 
17. See letter of E. Randolph to 1. Madison, Aug. I3, 1788, in Rutland, et al., eds., II 
The Papers of James Madison at 231-32 (cited in note 15). 
18. Letter of J. Madison to E. Randolph, Aug. 22, 1788, in Rutland, et al., eds., 11 
The Papers of James Madison at 237 (cited in note I5). 
19. Id. 'Yriti~g to Jeffe~on on August 23, I788, Madison again noted that "(a]n 
early ConventiOn IS m every v1ew to be dreaded in the present temper of America. A 
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These concerns were not confined to Madison's private writ-
ings, for he voiced much the same sentiments in Federalist 49 and 
50. Here Madison went out of his way to discuss a proposal that 
was not before the American public in 1787-1788: Jefferson's 
scheme, as sketched in Notes on the State of Virginia,zo to allow 
periodic or occasional appeals to the sovereign authority of the 
people to remedy situations in which one branch of government 
encroached on the constitutional duties of another. Madison 
faulted this proposal on three grounds. First, "frequent appeals" 
of this kind would "deprive the government of that veneration 
which time bestows on every thing," sapping "[the] reverence for 
the laws" and the useful "prejudices of the community" that even 
"the most rational government" requires. Second, Americans 
would not always act under the favorable circumstances that dur-
ing the Revolution had "repressed the passions most unfriendly 
to order and concord" and "stifled the ordinary diversity of opin-
ions on great national questions." Constitutional "experiments 
are of too ticklish a nature to be unnecessarily multiplied," espe-
cially if they risked "disturbing the public tranquillity by interest-
ing too strongly the public passions."zt Third, and most 
important, Madison feared that a public decision on a constitu-
tional dispute 
could never be expected to tum on the true merits of the ques-
tion. It would inevitably be connected with the spirit of pre-
existing parties, or of parties springing out of the question it-
self. It would be connected with persons of distinguished char-
acter. and extensive influence in the community. It would be 
pronounced by the very men who had been agents in, or oppo-
nents of the measures. to which the decision would relate. The 
passions, therefore, not the reason. of the public, would sit in 
judgment. But it is the reason of the public alone. that ought 
to control and regulate the government. The passions ought 
to be controlled and regulated by the Govemment.22 
On constitutional questions, then, as on ordinary political issues, 
Madison believed that any coherent expression of public opinion 
very short period of delay would produce the double advantage of diminishing the heat 
and increasing the light of all parties." 11 The Papers of James Madison at 238 (cited in 
note 15). 
20. For Jefferson's proposal in Notes on the State of Virginia, see the excerpt printed 
in Kurland and Lerner, eds., 1 The Founders' Constitution at 639-42 (cited in note 9). 
21. Federalist 49 (Hamilton) in Cooke, ed., The Federalist Papers at 340-41 (cited in 
note 4). 
22. Id. at 342-43. 
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would nearly always flow from the volatile forces of passion and 
interest that he was eager to "control." 
All of these arguments were prospective: all anticipated the 
role that public opinion would play in future constitutional dis-
putes. Arguably Madison might have believed that the special 
circumstances attending this original moment of constitution-
making of 1787-1788 were operating to allow public reason to 
ground its decision on "the true merits of the question." But 
again, little if anything in his private writings of this period indi-
cates that he held a more exalted opinion of the character of the 
original debate on the adoption of the Constitution. To suggest 
that he would have regarded the entire corpus of this public de-
bate as a reliable and authoritative index of what the Constitu-
tion originally meant, or an evidentiary resource to which later 
interpreters could confidently turn, stretches the boundaries of 
plausibility. 
Did Madison have a positive theory of his own to explain 
how the clauses of the Constitution might be interpreted to pre-
serve its essential equilibrium? Three principles best encapsulate 
the interpretive norms to which Madison originally subscribed. 
First, it is plausible to assume that his approach to constitutional 
intepretation would have been cautiously conservative and even 
originalist in this sense: that the aim of interpretation should be 
to preserve the original boundaries between departments and ju-
risdictions laid out in the text of the Constitution. But, in the 
second place, Madison's approach to the complementary 
problems of federalism and separation of powers rested on the 
recognition that these lines were not neatly or unambiguously 
drawn. As he put the crucial point in Federalist 37: 
Experience has instructed us that no skill in the science of 
Government has yet been able to discriminate and define, 
with sufficient certainty, its three great provinces, the Legisla-
tive, Executive, and Judiciary; or even the privileges and pow-
ers of the different Legislative branches. Questions daily 
occur in the course of practice, which prove the obscurity that 
reigns in these subjects, and which puzzle the greatest adepts 
in political science.23 
If that was the case, it followed that a more precise surveying of 
constitutional boundaries would depend on some course of inter-
pretation and adjustment. 
23. Federalist 37 (Madison) in Cooke, ed., The Federalist Papers at 235 (cited in note 
4). 
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As Madison went on to observe, "All new laws, though 
penned with the greatest technical skill, and passed on the fullest 
and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less ob-
scure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascer-
tained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications. "24 
Because a constitution was more than a statute, "liquidating" its 
meaning might require other forms of review than those custom-
arily applied to legislation. Yet no statute adopted in America 
had ever undergone "more mature" deliberation than the Consti-
tution itself, and though Madison did not develop the point ex-
plicitly, the same maxim would surely govern its interpretation as 
well. In this sense, Madison's original expectations about inter-
pretation probably lay fairly close to H. Jefferson Powell's ac-
count: the intended meaning of the Constitution would only 
become evident over time, as a course of "discussions and adjudi-
cations" set the precedents required to illuminate and clarify ex-
actly where the boundaries and landmarks of power lay. 
There was, however, a third and arguably more important 
expectation about the problem of constitutional interpretation 
that Madison harbored in 1787-1788, and which becomes all the 
more striking when it is juxtaposed with the positions he took in 
the years ahead. Madison did not believe that the most likely 
sources of encroachment which interpretation would have to ad-
dress and correct were evenly or symmetrically distributed 
throughout the constitutional system. The danger that alarmed 
him most-especially within the national realm of government-
would emanate from the House of Representatives, the one insti-
tution where the factious passions and interests of the people 
would be felt most immediately. Madison fittingly pursued this 
point in the final lines he wrote as Publius. "[T]he irresistible 
force possessed by that branch of a free government, which has 
the people on its side," he wrote in Federalist 63, made the com-
mon Anti-Federalist prediction that the Senate might "transform 
itself, by gradual usurpations, into an independent and aristo-
cratic body" utterly frivolous. Should it ever seek to do so, "the 
[H]ouse of [R]epresentatives, with the people on their side will at 
all times be able to bring back the constitution to its primitive 
form and principles." Not so the obverse situation. "Against the 
force of the immediate representatives of the people, nothing will 
be able to maintain even the constitutional authority of the 
[s]enate, but such a display of enlightened policy, and attachment 
to the public good, as will divide with that branch of the legisla-
24. !d. at 236. 
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ture, the affections and support of the entire body of the people 
themselves. "zs 
Nothing that transpired during the ratification debate or the 
first federal elections shook this opinion. While waiting for Con-
gress to assemble, Madison predicted that the new government 
would share many of the same democratic "features" of "the 
State Governments."26 When Congress conducted its first seri-
ous constitutional debate, he wrote Randolph that he favored a 
sole presidential power over the removal of executive officials 
because "I see, and politically feel that that will be the weak 
branch of the Government."27 This concern recurs in a letter to 
his mentor, Edmund Pendleton. "In truth, the Legislative power 
is of such a nature that it scarcely can be restrained either by the 
Constitution or by itself," Madison almost sighed. "And if the 
federal Government should lose its proper equilibrium within it-
self, I am persuaded that the effect will proceeed from the En-
croachments of the Legislative department." If the choice of 
evils lay between the Senate and the President, Madison added, 
there was more to fear from the upper house. But "I am fully in 
the opinion," he concluded, "that the numerous and immediate 
representatives of the people, composing the other House, will 
decidedly predominate in the Government."zs 
Over the next seven years, however, Madison had to reas-
sess these underlying premises of his thought. His movement to-
ward the endorsement of a form of originalism was not the 
product of a speculative effort to fashion a proper model of inter-
pretation, but a response to the events that generated the great 
partisan conflicts of the 1790s: the dispute over the bank in 1791, 
the outbreak of European war in 1793, and the prolonged debate 
over the Jay Treaty in 1795-1796. That does not mean, however, 
that Madison's reassessments were driven by politics alone, or 
that his constitutional positions were purely instrumental means 
to pursue political ends. For one thing, the boundary between 
the political and the constitutional cannot be so tidily drawn; for 
another, it would be an error to assume that agreement upon 
norms and procedures of constitutional interpretation accompa-
25. Federalist 63 (Hamilton) in Cooke, ed., The Federalist Papers at 430·31 (cited in 
note 4). 
26. Letter of J. Madison toT. Jefferson, Mar. 29, 1789, in Charles F. Hobson, et al., 
eds., 12 The Papers of James Madison 37, 38 (U. Press of Virginia, 1979). 
27. Letter of J. Madison to E. Randolph, May 31, 1789, in Hobson, et al., eds., 12 
The Papers of James Madison at 190 (cited in note 26). 
28. Letter of J. Madison to E. Pendleton, June 21, 1789, in Hobson, et al., eds., 12 
The Papers of James Madison at 253 (cited in note 26). 
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nied the adoption of the Constitution in 1788. It may well have 
been that the inclination to read the Constitution as a statute or 
contract might be read was the most natural course that Ameri-
cans could follow after 1789; but that did not preclude the emer-
gence of other norms of interpretation as Americans worked out 
the implications of treating popularly ratified constitutions as 
supreme law. 
One incident from the well-known House debate of June 
1789 over the removal power of the president does suggest that 
recourse to the documentary evidence relating to the adoption of 
the Constitution was not part of the interpretative quiver from 
which its first interpreters could readily draw.z9 One pole in this 
debate was occupied by William L. Smith of South Carolina, who 
argued that the president had no discretionary authority to re-
move subordinate officials, that impeachment was the only con-
stitutionally recognized mode of removal, and that this entire 
issue was probably best left to judicial resolution the first time a 
displaced official sued to retain his position. After failing to 
prove that removal required impeachment, Smith insisted that 
the consent of the Senate was constitutionally required to re-
move as well as appoint.3o This opinion was supported by "[a] 
publication of no inconsiderable eminence, in the class of polit-
ical writings on the constitution," Smith told the House on June 
16. He then read a passage from Federalist 77 affirming that 
"[t]he consent of [the Senate] would be necessary to displace as 
well as appoint. "31 But a rude shock awaited Smith. As he wrote 
Edward Rutledge shortly thereafter: 
the next day [Egbert] Benson [of New York] sent me a note 
across the house to this effect: that Pub/ius had informed him 
since the preceding day's debate, that upon mature reflection 
he had changed his opinion & was now convinced that the 
President alone should have the power of removal at pleasure; 
He is a Candidate for the office of Secretary of Finance!32 
29. For the initial debate on this issue, see Charlene Bangs Bickford, et al., eds., 10 
Documentary History of the First Federal Congress of the United States of America 718 
(John Hopkins U. Press, 1992) (recalling the debate of May 19, 1789) and Charlene Banks 
Bickford, et al., 11 Documentary History of the First Federal Congress ofthe United States 
of America 842-1036 (John Hopkins U. Press, 1992) (continuing the debate from June 16-
22, 1789). For analysis of the issues in this debate, see Donald G. Morgan, Congress and 
the Constitution: A Study of Responsibility 49-57 (Belknap Press, 1966). 
30. W. L. Smith, speech of June 16, 1789, in Bickford, et al., eds., 11 Documentary 
History at 860, 861-64 (cited in note 29). 
31. Id. at 861. 
32. Letter of W. Smith to E. Rutledge, June 21, 1789, in 69 South Carolina Historical 
Magazine 6, 8 (South Carolina Historical Society, 1968). 
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The candidate was, of course, Hamilton; and Smith may well 
have known that Madison was the other of the "two gentlemen 
of great information" who had written as "Publius."33 
As an exercise in interpretation, the removal debate fol-
lowed the prevailing rules of construction that emphasized the 
manifest language of the text, internal consistency, and fidelity to 
general principles. Congressmen disagreed not about these rules 
per se, but rather about matters of definition and the weight to 
be given to specific passages and principles. 
As interesting as the removal debate may be to scholars as 
the first example of constitutional interpretation under the new 
government, it was, of course, the debate of 1791 over the bill to 
charter a national bank that first opened the great fissure that 
widened every year thereafter-and which arguably resonates 
still.34 Curiously, neither Powell nor Lofgren pays any attention 
to the arguments Madison advanced in opposing the bank during 
the debate in the House; Powell instead examines the rival opin-
ions of secretaries Hamilton and Jefferson,3s while Lofgren looks 
ahead to Madison's reasoning on the process whereby precedent 
and popular acceptance made acceptable what was originally du-
bious.36 In fact, in the hunt for the origins of originalism, 
Madison's major speech of February 2, 1791, is noteworthy for 
several reasons. 
First, Madison clearly indicated that his knowledge of the 
deliberations at the Federal Convention, and thus of the framers' 
intentions, was a material factor informing his constitutional ob-
jections to the bank. His reservations were "the stronger, be-
cause he well recollected that a power to grant charters of 
incorporation had been proposed in the general convention and 
rejected."37 That proposal was in fact his own, numbered among 
a list of "proper" powers referred to the committee of detail on 
August 18, 1787. When no such power was reported, Madison 
renewed his motion (on September 14) to authorize Congress "to 
grant charters of incorporation where the interest of the U. S. 
might require & the legislative provisions of individual States 
33. W. L. Smith, speech of June 16, 1789. in Bickford, et al., eds., 11 Documentary 
History at 861 (cited in note 29). 
34. For the debate as a whole, see Benjamin B. Klubes, The First Federal Congress 
and the First National Bank: A Case Study in Constitutional Interpretation, 10 J. of the 
Early Republic 19 (1990); and Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism 
223-34 (Oxford U. Press, 1993). 
35. Rakove, ed., Interpreting the Constitution at 69-70 (cited in note 1). 
36. Id. at 139-40. 
37. J. Madison, speech of Feb. 2, 1791, in Charles F. Hobson, et al., eds., 13 The 
Papers of James Madison 372, 374 (U. Press of Virginia, 1984). 
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may be incompetent." Rufus King and James Wilson clearly 
thought this proposal embraced banks, for they disagreed 
whether its approval would damage the prospects for ratification 
by exciting the financial rivalries of Philadelphia and New York. 
The proposal was abandoned after the delegates rejected a test 
vote on a "modified" motion "limited to the case of canals." 
Nothing in Madison's notes indicates that the motion was 
thought superfluous because the necessary-and-proper clause al-
ready reached the power in question. That is, his very purpose in 
proposing the power in question presumed that without such ex-
plicit authority, the new Congress could not readily issue charters 
of incorporation. On the other hand, just as Wilson thought that 
a power to create "mercantile monopolies" was "already in-
cluded in the power to regulate trade," so other framers may 
have reasoned that a power to charter banks could derive from 
other clauses.3s 
Madison did not claim that this tidbit of history was conclu-
sive in itself; he merely sought to demonstrate that his scruples 
were not contrived for the moment.39 Instead, as "preliminaries 
to a right interpretation," he proceeded to offer several "rules." 
The first two argued that when the "meaning" of a provision was 
"doubtful, it is fairly triable by its consequences," especially 
when "the very characteristic of the government" might be 
threatened. Madison's next two rules laid the groundwork for an 
originalist method of construction: 
In controverted cases, the meaning of the parties to the 
instrument. if to be collected by reasonable evidence, is a 
proper guide. 
38. Debate of Sept. 14, 1787, in Max Farrand, ed., 2 The Records of the Federal 
Convention of 1787 at 325, 615-16 (Yale U. Press, rev. ed., 1966) ("Records"). In 1798, 
Abraham Baldwin recounted to Jefferson a conversation he had had with Wilson when 
the bank bill was under discussion, in which Baldwin recalled and Wilson agreed that 
Robert Morris had moved in Convention to give Congress a specific power to incorporate 
banks, but Gouverneur Morris had opposed the idea with the political arguments that 
Madison's notes ascribe to King. Farrand, ed., 3 Records at 375. 
39. It is noteworthy, too, that Madison had reasoned similarly about the Constitu-
tion a year earlier, when Tench Coxe proposed a scheme to set aside national lands as a 
fund to lure European inventors to bring their machinery to America. Letter ofT. Coxe 
to J. Madison, Mar. 21, 1790, in Hobson, et al., eds., 13 The Papers of James Madison at 
112-13 (cited in note 37). Though Madison had proposed an appropriate provision at the 
Convention, it had been whittled down to the sole incentives of limited patents and copy-
rights. "This fetter on the National Legislature tho' an unfortunate one, was a deliberate 
one," Madison concluded. "The Latitude of authority now wished for was strongly urged 
and expressly rejected." Letter of J. Madison toT. Coxe, Mar. 30, 1790, in Hobson, et al., 
eds., 13 The Papers of James Madison at 128 (cited in note 37). 
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Contemporary and concurrent expositions are a reason-
able evidence of the meaning of the parties.40 
Here, then, a second and more important originalist implication 
of Madison's speech leaps into view (though overlooked by Pow-
ell and Lofgren): Madison was already prepared to suggest that 
historical evidence drawn from the ratification debates did pro-
vide a legitimate, relevant basis for interpretation. Ignoring The 
Federalist, which offered little support for his position, Madison 
looked elsewhere, reading passages from the debates in the 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and North Carolina conventions to affirm 
that Federalists had repeatedly argued "that the powers not 
given" to the national government "were retained; and that those 
given were not to be extended by remote implications"; and fur-
ther, "that the terms necessary and proper gave no additional 
powers to those enumerated." Madison did not describe these 
opinions as anything more than expositions; they only confirmed 
arguments that could be advanced on more familiar grounds. 
But the germ of an intepretive theory of original understanding 
was nonetheless present.4I 
That this theory was something of a novelty seems to be cor-
roborated by the thorough rebuke it elicited from Elbridge 
Gerry, the non-signing framer of the Constitution who later be-
came Madison's vice-president. Dismissing Madison's rules as 
"being made for the occasion," Gerry invoked the "sanctioned" 
authority of Blackstone to propose that the House follow more 
settled rules. "[T]he fairest and most rational method to inter-
pret the will of the legislator," Blackstone had written, "is, by 
exploring his intention at the time when the law was made, by 
signs the most natural and probable; and these signs are either 
the words, the context, the subject matter, the effect and conse-
quences, or the spirit and reason of the law."42 Gerry did not 
identify the "legislator" whose "will" and "intention" he was an-
alyzing, but he offered telling objections that grasped the prob-
lem of recovering a coherent collective intention by aggregating 
individual opinions. As for Madison's appeal to the Federal 
Convention, Gerry asked, 
40. J. Madison, speech of Feb. 2, 1791, in Hobson, et al., eds., 13 Papers of James 
Madison at 374 (cited in note 37). 
41. ld. at 380. 
42. E. Gerry, speech of Feb. 7, 1791, in M. St. Clarke and D.A. Hall, eds., Legislative 
and Documentary History of the Bank of the United States 75-81 (Augustus M. Kelley, 
reprint ed., 1967). 
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are we to depend on the memory of the gentleman for an his-
tory of their debates, and from thence to collect their sense? 
This would be improper, because the memories of different 
gentlemen would probably vary, as they have already done, 
with respect to those facts; and. if not, the opinions of the indi-
vidual members, who debated, are not to be considered as the 
opinions of the convention.43 
Gerry then demonstrated the fallibility of his own memory by 
wrongly claiming that the proposition the Convention had enter-
tained was one "to erect commercial corporations." But his ob-
jection grew stronger when he turned to Madison's use of the 
ratification conventions. It was well known that these records 
were "partial and mutilated," Gerry noted. Even if that bias was 
discounted, the speech "of one member" could not be taken "as 
expressing the sense of a convention." Finally, Gerry recalled 
how the urgency of the ratification proceedings led both "parties 
to depart from candor, and to call in the aid of art, flattery, pro-
fessions of friendship" and other doubtful tactics. "Under such 
circumstances," he concluded, "the opinions of great men ought 
not to be considered as authorities, and, in many instances, could 
not be recognised by themselves. "44 
Madison did not answer these points in his second speech of 
February 8-except to marvel at how far Gerry had come since 
1787. "[T]he powers of the constitution were then dark, inexplic-
able and dangerous," Madison observed, recalling Gerry's objec-
tions to the Constitution, "but now, perhaps as the result of 
experience they are clear and luminous!"4s After Congress ap-
proved the bank bill, the President asked Attorney General Ran-
dolph, Jefferson, and Hamilton to brief the issue. Only Jefferson 
followed Madison's lead in looking to the evidence of 1787-1788, 
and he did so merely to note that the Convention had rejected 
the power in question. But Randolph, while also opposing the 
bill, thought that neither the "almost unknown history" of the 
Convention nor opinions given during ratification could be re-
garded.46 Hamilton refuted the argument even more vigorously. 
"[N]o inference whatever can be drawn" from the unauthenti-
43. ld. at 79. 
44. ld. at 80. 
45. J. Madison, speech of Feb. 8, 1791, in Hobson, et al., eds., 13 Papers of James 
Madison at 385 (cited in note 37). Madison was, of course, referring to Gerry's objections 
to the Constitution. Gerry had been one of the three delegates to the Convention who 
had declined to sign the completed Constitution (along with Madison's Virginia col-
leagues, George Mason and Edmund Randolph). 
46. Opinion of E. Randolph, Feb. 12, 1791, in Clark and Hall, eds., Legislative and 
Documentary History at 90 (cited in note 42). 
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cated and "very different accounts" that might be given of the 
Convention's action. Hamilton concluded this discussion by re-
stating the familiar rule of interpretation.47 Jefferson could "not 
deny, that, whatever may have been the intentions of the framers 
of a constitution, or of a law, that intention is to be sought for in 
the instrument itself, according to the usual and established rules 
of construction."4s Washington signed the bill. 
Hamilton's opinion and Gerry's speech certainly confirm, as 
Powell argues, that the prevailing rules of interpretation did not 
yet permit the recourse to historical evidence that a sound theory 
of originalism would require. Even for Madison, arguments 
drawn from the text and structure of the Constitution seemed to 
weigh more heavily in his opposition to the bank than did his 
corroboratory appeals to the intentions and understandings of 
1787-1788. Yet his use of historical evidence indicates that as 
early as 1791 he was prepared to argue that the understandings 
of the ratifiers could erect a legitimate fence around the limits of 
construction. Nor was Madison's originalism wholly contrived to 
meet expedient political needs. He would not have proposed ad-
ding a power to grant charters of incorporation to Article I had 
he believed that the necessary and proper clause would work to 
the same effect. More important, his criticism of an open-ended 
interpretation of this clause, however dubious it appears to schol-
arly commentators, was clearly consistent with the critique of leg-
islation on which his constitutional theory rested. The great 
problem of republicanism was to develop constitutional mecha-
nisms and political understandings to limit the plasticity of legis-
lative power and the irresistible force of public opinion behind 
it.49 Licensing Congress to make its discretion the test of its au-
thority was the last precedent Madison wished to set while the 
process of ascertaining the meaning of the Constitution was still 
far from complete. 
This fundamental premise of Madison's theory became in-
creasingly problematic, however, after 1791, when foreign affairs 
overtook domestic policy as the chief source of partisan conflict. 
The imperatives of diplomacy placed a premium on the energy 
and dispatch the framers had envisioned for the presidency; they 
also gave the administration a political initiative to which the op-
position Republicans in Congress could only react. The constitu-
47. Opinion of A. Hamilton. Feb. 23, 1791, in Clark and Hall, eds., Legislative and 
Documentary History at 101 (cited in note 42). 
48. Id. 
49. For further commentary on this point, see Rakove, Original Meanings at 46-54, 
310-16, 330-36 (cited in note 13). 
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tional implications of this dispute were first laid out in a famous 
exchange between Hamilton (writing as "Pacificus") and 
Madison (writing as "Helvidius"). Defending the administra-
tion's April 1793 decision to issue a proclamation of neutrality 
without consulting Congress, then in recess, Hamilton argued 
that the conduct of foreign relations was inherently executive in 
nature, except in those cases (treaties, diplomatic appointments, 
declarations of war) where the Constitution explicitly dictated 
otherwise.5o 
Madison replied that this improper view of executive power 
seemed to derive from two sources. One was the ideas of such 
authorities as Locke and Montesquieu, whose views were "evi-
dently warped" by their admiration for the British constitution.5I 
The other was the model of executive prerogative that British 
theory and practice placed in the crown. In preference to these 
sources, Madison concluded, one need only read the works of a 
recent American writer: Hamilton himself -or rather Publius, 
though the authors of The Federalist were now publicly known. 
Drawing on Federalist 69 and 75, Madison quoted passages which 
contradicted the claims of "Pacificus," noting that they were 
"made at a time when no application to persons or measures 
could bias: The opinion given was not transiently mentioned, but 
formally and critically elucidated: It related to a point in the con-
stitution which must consequently have been viewed as of impor-
tance in the public mind. "52 Had the Federalists of 1788 been 
privy to the analysis of "Pacificus," Madison concluded, they 
could only have thought it " 'an experiment on public 
credulity.' "53 
Madison's recourse to The Federalist was made largely for 
rhetorical effect; he did not suggest that "Pacificus" was wrong 
because he contradicted Publius, only that these essays exposed 
the fallacy in Hamilton's reasoning. Originalism itself was not at 
stake in 1793. But it did become a serious question in 1795-1796, 
after the Senate narrowly approved the controversial treaty that 
Chief Justice John Jay brought back from Britain. Only then was 
the treaty published, eliciting a storm of protest that alarmed 
50. See Letter of "Pacificus," No. I, June 29, 1793, in Harold C. Syrett and Jacob E. 
Cooke, eds., 15 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 33-43 (Columbia U. Press, 1969). 
51. Letter of "Helvidius," No.1, Aug. 24, 1793, in Thomas A. Mason, et al., eds., 15 
The Papers of James Madison 68 (U. Press of Virginia, 1985). 
52. ld. at 72. 
53. Letter of "Helvidius," No.3, Sep. 7, 1793, in Mason, et al., eds., 15 The Papers of 
James Madison at 97 (cited in note 51). This last uncredited quotation carne from Federal-
ist 24, as only Madison and (perhaps) its author, Hamilton, were likely to know. 
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Washington but failed to deter his ratification of the treaty in 
August 1795. Barred from blocking the treaty politically, the Re-
publican opposition fashioned constitutional barriers to its imple-
mentation, hoping to capitalize on their majority in the House 
when the Fourth Congress convened in December. 
Treaty opponents made three claims on behalf of the consti-
tutional authority of the House in treaty-making. Should not a 
treaty which affected foreign trade require the approval of the 
House (which shared the congressional power to regulate com-
merce)? If public funds had to be expended to implement the 
treaty, should the House not judge those appropriations on their 
merits? And how could it exercise this traditional power without 
considering the treaty proper, which might in turn justify examin-
ing other records relating to its negotiation?54 Though Madison 
was reluctant to take this ground, he was also the principal au-
thor of a widely reprinted petition to the Virginia assembly 
whose fourth major complaint held that "The President and Sen-
ate by ratifying this Treaty, usurp the powers of regulating com-
merce, of making rules with respect to aliens, of establishing 
tribunals of justice, and of defining piracy" -all powers of 
Congress.ss 
The burden of defending the treaty fell largely to Hamilton, 
now retired to his legal practice. In thirty-eight numbers of "The 
Defence," Hamilton and Rufus King justified the Jay Treaty 
largely on its merits, reaching the constitutional questions only in 
the final three essays published just after the new year. In the 
first of these essays, Hamilton argued that the plain text of the 
supremacy clause bound the House no less than the states to ad-
here to duly ratified treaties.s6 The next essay argued that the 
claims made for the House would render the formal treaty power 
of the President and Senate "altogether nominal,"s7 thereby vio-
54. For an introduction to the constitutional questions, see Abraham D. Sofaer, 
War, Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Power: The Origins 85-93 (Ballinger Publishing 
Co., 1976), and the fascinating article by Ruth Wedgwood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom 
of Jonathan Robbins, 100 Yale L.J. 229, 260-68 (1990). 
55. Petition to General Assembly by J. Madison, Oct. 12, 1795, in Stagg, ed., 16 The 
Papers of James Madison at 102 (cited in note 3). This point does not appear in the draft 
version of this petition which the editors of The Papers of James Madison have recently 
identified, and it is possible its addition came at the urging of Jefferson, whom the Madis-
ons visited only days before the petition was first printed. Draft of Petition to the Gen-
eral Assembly by J. Madison, Sep. 1795, in Stagg, ed., 16 The Papers of James Madison 62-
69 (cited in note 3 ). 
56. See "The Defence No. XXXVI," Jan. 2, 1796, in Harold C. Syrett, ed., 20 The 
Papers of Alexander Hamilton 3 (Columbia U. Press, 1974). 
57. "The Defence No. XXXVII," Jan. 6, 1796, in Syrett, ed., 20 The Papers of Alex-
ander Hamilton at 13 (cited in note 56). 
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lating the rule of construction which required "that every instru-
ment is so to be interpreted, that all the parts may if possible 
consist with each other. "ss If the claims made for the House 
were allowed, pretexts could always be found to assert that a 
treaty trenched upon some aspect of legislation, thereby empty-
ing the language of the treaty clause of any meaning.s9 
The last essay was addressed to Madison. Here Hamilton 
asked how the treaty power "was understood by the Convention, 
in framing it, and by the people in adopting it." No "formal 
proof of the opinions" of the framers existed, Hamilton con-
ceded. "But from the best opportunity of knowing the fact"-
thus intimating that the author of "The Defence" was himself a 
framer-it was evident that they thought the treaty power was 
comprehensive in its reach.60 For the truth of this claim he ap-
pealed to the two former framers-Madison and Abraham Bald-
win-expected to "obstruct ... execution" of the Jay Treaty in 
the House. Hamilton then cited George Mason's and Gerry's 
objections to the Constitution as proof that the treaty power 
vested "an exclusive power of legislation" in the President and 
Senate.6t Nor was this an Anti-Federalist opinion alone, for in a 
lengthy footnote, Hamilton quoted two of Madison's essays in 
The Federalist to confirm that Federalists had argued that the 
joint role of the President and Senate left the treaty power "suffi-
ciently guarded."62 Where "Publius" was concerned, turn-about 
was fair play. 
In March, Washington asked the House to appropriate funds 
to implement the treaty. Republicans then introduced a resolu-
tion asking the President to provide the executive papers that 
would enable the House to view the treaty in its proper light. 
Federalists answered this request by applying the conventional 
norms of legal construction. "Are we to explain the Treaty by 
private and confidential papers, or by any thing extraneous to the 
instrument itself?" asked Daniel Buck of Vermont.63 A chal-
lenge to a treaty "should be determined from the face of the in-
strument," William L. Smith argued; "a knowledge of the 
preparatory steps which led to its adoption, could throw no light 
58. ld. at 19. 
59. See id. generally. 
60. "The Defence No. XXXVIII," Jan. 9, 1796, in Syrett, ed., 20 The Papers of Alex-
ander Hamilton at 22 (cited in note 56). 
61. ld. at 22-23. 
62. I d. at 24 and n. *. 
63. W. Seaton and J. Gales, Jr., eds., 4th Cong., 1st Sess. Debates and Proceedings in 
the Congress of the United States 432 (Gales and Seaton, 1834-1856) ("Annals of 
Congress"). 
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upon it." The President would not "examine the Journals of the 
House" to test the constitutionality of a law, Smith added, nor 
would the Supreme Court do so in its imminent decision deter-
mining whether the federal carriage tax should be classed as a 
direct tax to be apportioned according to the three-fifths rule 
(the first case in which the Court clearly tested the constitutional-
ity of a congressional statute ).64 
When the Republicans persisted, however, the focus of de-
bate shifted from the treaty to the Constitution. Though 
Madison had misgivings about this strategy, he joined the fray in 
a lengthy speech on March 10, 1796. His argument rested on text 
and inference alone, not history. If Federalist arguments were 
given full force, he asserted, the House would be obliged to for-
feit its "deliberation & discretion" and to support indefinitely a 
war triggered by a treaty of alliance framed by the President and 
Senate alone. regardless of its power over war, armies, and ap-
propriations. Acknowledging some role for the House was the 
only way to give "signification to every part of the Constitution," 
even if the designated holders of the treaty power had to cope 
with the difficulties created.6s 
The immediate response to Madison's delayed entrance into 
the debate came from Smith, well known as Hamilton's spokes-
man. Smith "appeal[ed] to the general sense of the whole nation 
at the time the Constitution was formed," noting that through 
these "contemporaneous expositions," formed "when the subject 
was viewed only in relation to the abstract power, and not to a 
particular Treaty, we should come at the truth." Madison had 
made the same claim for The Federalist in his "Helvidius" letters, 
but Smith went one step further. Had the Virginia convention in 
which Madison served thought that the legislative authority of 
the House could check the treaty power, it would not have pro-
posed an amendment to require commercial treaties to be rati-
fied by two-thirds of all senators (rather than a quorum).66 
Theodore Sedgwick also made Madison his target. Did not 
Madison's "known caution and prudence" oblige him to explain, 
Sedgwick wondered, how the Federal Convention could have ne-
glected to express the "true meaning" he had so belatedly discov-
ered? Madison and other framers "certainly knew what they had 
so recently intended" at Philadelphia when they defended the 
64. Gales and Seaton, eds., Annals of Congress at 439-40 (cited in note 63). 
65. See J. Madison, speech of Mar. 10, 1796, in Stagg, ed., 16 The Papers of James 
Madison at 255-63 (cited in note 3). 
66. Gales and Seaton, eds., Annals of Congress at 495 (cited in note 63). 
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treaty power in the state conventions. But they had never an-
swered objections to the treaty clause with the theory Madison 
now maintained; they had instead argued that the power was well 
secured by the mutual check of the President and Senate. And 
responding to a complaint that Smith "had not quoted any part 
of the proceedings on the subject, or of the reasons that led to 
the amendment," Sedgwick read at length from the Virginia 
records, citing speakers on both sides to recreate the structure of 
its debate.67 
Sedgwick thus implied that the intentions of the framers 
were relevant, and one other major Federalist speech developed 
the point further. It was well known that the politics of the Con-
vention revolved around the compromise between small and 
large states over the Senate, Benjamin Bourne of Rhode Island 
reminded the House. That, too, indicated that the House did not 
possess the authority claimed. But Bourne also relied on 
speeches in the ratification conventions to make his point; he 
agreed, with Sedgwick, that "the real inquiry was, what opinion 
was entertained on this subject by those who ratified the Consti-
tution."6s That was the question which engaged the other speak-
ers who examined the evidence of 1787-1788. In this inquiry, 
both Federalists and Republicans suggested that the ratifiers and, 
beyond them, the American people had in some sense consented 
to the particular interpretation each side was now advancing. 
"The people have declared that the President and Senate shall 
make Treaties, without a single exception," Isaac Smith ob-
served, "and, lest there should be any mistake or cavilling about 
it, they have put it in written words, as they thought, too plain to 
be doubted, too positive to be contradicted."69 On the other 
side, Republicans argued that the Constitution itself might never 
have been ratified had the people realized that the President and 
Senate would possess this "uncontrollable power."7o Several 
speakers asked whose original understandings were to be treated 
as more authoritative, the majority's or the minority's? William 
Findley, the leading Pennsylvania Anti-Federalist now turned 
Republican, even found himself ironically reflecting that he did 
67. Gales and Seaton, eds., Annals of Congress at 519-20, 522-27 (cited in note 63); 
the complaint that no recourse had been made to the actual debates came from William 
Branch Giles, a leading Republican from Virginia. ld. at 502-03. 
68. For Sedgwick's quotation, see Gales and Seaton, eds., Annals of Congress at 
526-27 (cited in note 63). For Bourne's comments see id. at 567. 
69. Gales and Seaton, eds., Annals of Congress at 627 (Smith) (cited in note 63). 
See also id. at 516 (expressing similar views). 
70. Gales and Seaton, eds., Annals of Congress, at 543-46 (Holland) (cited in note 
63). See also id. at 635 (stating similar views by Livingston). 
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not "expect the sentiments of a minority, acting under peculiar 
circumstances of irritation, and consisting of but about one-fifth 
of the members [at Harrisburg], to be quoted as a good authority 
for the true sense of the Constitution."71 
From these remarks, it seems apparent that the House was 
prepared to entertain interpretations reconstructing the positions 
of framers, ratifiers, and "the people." The ensuing disagree-
ments prompted a few representatives, on both sides, to suggest 
that recourse to historical evidence was futile. Edward Living-
ston, the author of the original motion seeking the treaty papers, 
even declared that "we were now as capable at least of determin-
ing the true meaning of that instrument as the Conventions were; 
they were called in haste, they were heated by party, and many 
adopted it from expediency, without having fully debated the dif-
ferent articles."n But that did not stop him from undertaking his 
own originalist analysis, nor did it recall the House to traditional 
rules of construction. In these exchanges, Federalists gained the 
upper hand, leading Republicans to rely on the analogical rea-
soning to the British constitution that Madison had spurned in 
"Helvidius." If the British king submitted treaties to Parliament 
when they required further legal action, they reasoned, did it not 
follow that the American House retained at least equal author-
ity? Federalists dismissed this reasoning in the same terms that 
Madison had condemned "Pacificus" in 1793. "[T]he practice 
and prerogatives of that despotic Court" were irrelevant, Daniel 
Buck exclaimed. "What have they to do with a Constitution, 
which is the express will of the great body of the people of 
America, prescribing rules for her own self-government?"73 
Notwithstanding the problems they faced in rebutting such 
blunt remarks, the Republican majority approved the call for the 
treaty papers. In his short but cogent reply, Washington made 
little use of the extended memorandum that he had solicited 
from Hamilton-with the exception of one point. Hamilton had 
reminded Washington that the Convention had "overruled" a 
motion to involve the House in treatymaking, and the President 
made this the concluding point of his reply. If one consulted the 
71. Gales and Seaton, eds., Annals of Congress at 591-92 (Findley) (cited in note 
63). See also id. at 578-80 (stating remedies by Brent). 
72. Gales and Seaton, eds., Annals of Congress, at 635 (Livingston). See also id. at 
647 (stating the views of Milledge, a Republican, citing the necessary and proper clause to 
uphold the authority of the House!), 657-58 (citing Coit, a Federalist, then proceeding to 
reflect on conduct of Baldwin and Madison). 
73. Gales and Seaton, eds., Annals of Congress at 703-10 (quotations at 709-10) 
(cited in note 63). This analogy had been made frequently since the start of the debate, 
especially by the rising Republican star, Albert Gallatin. See id. at 464. 
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Convention journal, which Washington (its custodian) had since 
deposited in the Department of State, "it will appear" that a mo-
tion to require treaties to be "ratified by a Law" had been "ex-
plicitly rejected."74 Had Hamilton been present at Philadelphia 
when Gouverneur Morris made this motion on August 23, 1787, 
he might also have reminded Washington that Madison had first 
"suggested the inconvenience of requiring a legal ratification of 
treaties of alliance for purposes of war," then wondered whether 
the Convention should distinguish types of treaties which might 
or might not require "the concurrence of the whole Legisla-
ture. "7s If that evidence implied that the exclusion of the House 
from treatymaking troubled Madison in 1787, it also confirmed 
the crucial point of how the Constitution as written, was to be 
interpreted now-for, of course, no such distinction had been 
made. 
When the House continued to pursue the issue after learning 
of the President's refusal, Madison felt compelled to reenter a 
debate he had worriedly observed since early March. His speech 
of April6, 1796, offers perhaps the clearest (and most frequently 
cited) statement of his acceptance of a version of originalism. It 
was framed partly in response to Washington's appeal to the 
journal of the Convention, which Madison now judged improper 
even though he had reasoned much the same way in 1791. But 
Madison had also been stung by the criticism he had personally 
suffered when William Vans Murray, a young congressman from 
Maryland, appealed directly to him during a lengthy speech of 
March 23. In what must have been a dramatic moment, Murray 
first praised Madison as the man to whose "genius and patriot-
ism, in a great degree, he had always understood, were we in-
debted for the Constitution." But he then urged Madison to 
rescue the House from its confusion. 
If the Convention spoke mysterious phrases, and the gen-
tleman helped to utter them, will not the gentleman aid the 
expounding of the mystery? If the gentleman was the Pythia 
in the temple, ought he not to explain the ambiguous language 
of the oracle? To no man's exposition would he listen with 
more deference. 
74. For the Republican approval of the call for the treaty papers, see letter of A. 
Hamilton to G. Washington, Mar. 29, 1796, in Syrett, ed., 20 The Papers of Alexander 
Hamilton 85, 100. For Washington's reply, see letter of G. Washington to A. Hamilton, 
Mar. 31, 1796, in Syrett, ed., 20 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 103 (cited in note 56). 
75. Farrand, ed., 2 Records at 392-94 (cited in note 38). Hamilton was away in New 
York at the time. 
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Yet Murray could not have disguised the mocking taunt that 
lurked beneath the praise, the implication that Madison had said 
little because the evidence did not sustain his position. 
Nor did Murray halt there. In language that carried 
Madison back to his researches of 1787, Murray noted that "the 
historian and the commentator" who studies other constitutions 
have "to resort to records unintelligible" or "to the uncertain 
lights of mere tradition." But Americans no longer had to settle 
for this obscurity. They had known "the Constitution from its 
cradle" and "its infancy," better than any other society had ever 
known its constitution. But if the perplexing "doubts" the House 
now faced could be raised "upon some of its plainest passages," 
what hope was there that posterity would maintain the bounda-
ries of power? 
One hundred years hence, should a great question arise upon 
the construction, what would not be the value of that man's 
intelligence, who. allowed to possess integrity and a profound 
and unimpaired mind, should appear in the awful moments of 
doubt, and, being known to have been in the illustrious body 
that framed the instrument, should clear up difficulties by his 
contemporaneous knowledge? Such a man would have twice 
proved a blessing to his country. 
Again, the younger man's homage could not conceal a hint of 
mockery.76 
Madison answered both Murray and the President on April 
6. His speech was less an affirmation of the possibilities of using 
the understandings of the ratifiers to fix the meaning of the Con-
stitution than an attempt to nullify any appeal to the authority 
and intentions of the framers. Madison disclaimed having either 
the resources or the obligation to speak for "the intention of the 
whole body" of the Convention. That would be a matter of some 
"delicacy," because the framers had disagreed in their opinions 
(though some, he added, supported his current position). More-
over, he had a personal reason to avoid this mode of argument, 
for had he not been roundly criticized when he "incidentally" re-
ferred to the Convention during the bank debate of 1791? Nor 
had any other dispute yet been settled this way. And then 
Madison reached the critical transition: 
But, after all, whatever veneration might be entertained 
for the body of men who formed our constitution, the sense of 
that body could never be regarded as the oracular guide in the 
76. Gales and Seaton, eds., Annals of Congress at 700-02 (cited in note 63). 
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expounding the constitution. As the instrument came from 
them. it was nothing more than the draught of a plan, nothing 
but a dead letter, until life and validity were breathed into it, 
by the voice of the people, speaking through the several state 
conventions. If we were to look therefore, for the meaning of 
the instrument, beyond the face of the instrument, we must 
look for it not in the general convention, which proposed, but 
in the state conventions, which accepted and ratified the 
constitution. 
This conclusion was entirely consistent with the great political 
and theoretical insight that had enabled Madison to persuade the 
Convention to follow his agenda. But as he then applied the evi-
dence of ratification to the issue at hand, his qualified conclu-
sions revealed more of the limitations attending this mode of 
interpretation than the blinding light it would shed on the true 
meaning of the Constitution.77 
Again ignoring The Federalist, Madison limited his analysis 
to two categories of evidence. As to the first category-the pub-
lished record of the conventions (Pennsylvania, Virginia, and 
North Carolina) where the treaty power was debated seriously-
he had little to say. While noting that the speakers had regarded 
the treaty power as "limited" in nature, Madison ignored the 
Federalist objection that this limitation inhered in the division 
between President and Senate. Instead he pursued the analogy 
to the British constitution, which he weakly corroborated with an 
irrelevant allusion to the pardoning power. Madison concluded 
this part of the argument by conceding that even the Virginia 
debates, as published, "contained internal evidences in abun-
dance of chasms, and misconceptions of what was said. "78 
The second category-the amendments proposed by the 
state conventions-were a "better authority," but not free of lia-
bilities. No one could "expect a perfect precision and system" in 
these measures, given "the agitations of the public mind on that 
occasion, with the hurry and compromise which generally pre-
vailed in settling the amendments to be proposed. "79 Madison 
nonetheless plunged ahead to consider the amendments as they 
related to the allocation of the treaty power. Here, again, his 
argument did little more than speculate that the framers of those 
amendments would have favored the construction now advanced 
by the Republican majority. Madison then considered two other 
77. J. Madison, speech of Apr. 6, 1796, in Stagg, ed., 16 The Papers of James 
Madison at 294-96 (cited in note 3). 
78. ld. at 296. 
79. I d. at 297. 
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classes of amendments: those which had denied that laws could 
be suspended without the assent of the legislature, and those to 
require supermajorities for legislation relating to war, commerce, 
and appropriations. He concluded this analysis with another 
speculative question. Could the authors of these amendments, 
all of which touched upon powers whose exercise could be con-
strained by the treaty power, have supposed that they had given 
the President and Senate "an absolute and unlimited power" free 
of any control by the House?so 
At no point did Madison explain how proposals designed to 
remedy perceived defects in the Constitution-proposals that he 
himself had ignored in compiling his amendments of 1789, and 
which went unadopted-could prevail over the explicit language 
of the treaty clause. He never explained how criticisms of the 
Constitution could be transformed into interpretations of its 
meaning, when the opposite inference was more logical. Nor did 
he explain how partial and hasty expressions of opinion in indi-
vidual states could trump the contrary position that Federalists 
occupied in this debate when they treated the language of the 
Constitution as an expression of the "intention" of a sovereign 
people. At only one point did Madison briefly stumble upon an 
answer to these seemingly fatal objections, when he described an 
amendment to the treaty power proposed by North Carolina as 
"intended to ascertain, rather than to alter the meaning of the 
constitution."sl But developing this point would only have ex-
posed his position to another powerful objection. How could an 
unadopted amendment proposed by a state rejoining the union 
after the Constitution had taken effect be regarded as 
authoritative? 
When this prospect was raised in 1788, Madison vehemently 
denied that states might ratify the Constitution conditionally in 
the expectation that specific amendments would be adopted 
later. Where else could such a process end except in a second 
general convention whose prospects for success must be far 
worse than that of the meeting at Philadelphia?82 Madison could 
hardly have drafted his speech of April 6 without recalling this 
concern; the manifest problems he now encountered in articulat-
80. ld. at 297-99. 
81. ld. at 298. 
82. For example, see Letter of J. Madison to E. Randolph, Apr. 10, I788, in Rut-
land, et al., eds., 11 The Papers of James Madison at 18-19 (cited in note 15); Letter of J. 
Madison to A. Hamilton, July 20, I788, in Rutland, et al., eds., II The Papers of James 
Madison at 189 (cited in note 15); and Letter of J. Madison toT. Jefferson, Aug. 11, 1788, 
in Rutland, et al., eds., 11 The Papers of James Madison at 225-26 (cited in note 15). 
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ing his ideas may have been a mark of the intellectual embarrass-
ment he felt. 
If this was originalism, then, Madison was not yet prepared 
to make the most of it. His best known statement of the theory 
was marred by unresolved problems. Whatever clarity he gained 
by distinguishing framers from ratifiers was clouded by the diffi-
culty of using the ambiguous debates and failed amendments of 
1787-1788 to offset an express constitutional provision. After 
balking at using these sources in his first speech on the Jay 
Treaty, he was later driven to invoke their authority less by his 
belief that they provided a viable method of interpretation than 
by the arguments of other speakers, the President's message, and 
Murray's pointed appeal. In this debate, the more successful 
originalists were the Federalists whom Madison elsewhere ac-
cused of using the loose canon of Hamiltonian construction to 
enlarge the meaning of the Constitution. When Smith, Sedgwick, 
Bourne, and Murray appealed to the evidence of 1787-1788, they 
could plausibly argue that these opinions merited consideration 
because they were formed at a moment when partisan wrangling 
over a particular treaty was not a bias.s3 But if originalism could 
thus be defended as a neutral mode of interpretation, the temp-
tation to resort to it was manifestly political. It was dictated not 
by the prior conviction that this was the most appropriate strat-
egy to ascertain the meaning of the Constitution, but by consid-
erations of partisan advantage. 
That did not prevent commentators from forming opinions 
with greater or lesser degrees of neutrality, nor did it banish the 
ideal of neutrality from the temples of constitutional judgment. 
It merely demonstrated that neutrality could rarely be attained 
when the Constitution was so highly politicized, or when politics 
were so highly constitutionalized. This was not what Madison 
had intended in 1787, nor what he desired a decade later; but he 
contributed as much to this result as any of his colleagues and 
contemporaries, and he lived long enough to foresee its most 
tragic implications. 
83. Even this claim might be considered problematic. In 1788, concern over the 
potential negotiation of a treaty of commerce with Spain, in which the United States 
might abjure its rights to navigate the Mississippi and have. fr~e a~ess to t~e .~ulf of 
Mexico, was a major impediment to ratification of the Constttutwn m both Vtrgtma and 
North Carolina. 
